College of the Holy Cross

CrossWorks
Economics Department Working Papers

Economics Department

6-1-2013

Love, Toil, and Health Insurance: Why American
Husbands Retire When They Do
Joshua Congdon-Hohman
College of the Holy Cross, jcongdon@holycross.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers
Part of the Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Congdon-Hohman, Joshua, "Love, Toil, and Health Insurance: Why American Husbands Retire When They Do" (2013). Economics
Department Working Papers. Paper 5.
http://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers/5

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at CrossWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Papers by an authorized administrator of CrossWorks.

Love, Toil, and Health Insurance: Why American Husbands
Retire When They Do

By

Joshua Congdon-Hohman

June 2013

COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
FACULTY RESEARCH SERIES, PAPER NO. 11-14*

Department of Economics
College of the Holy Cross
Box 45A
Worcester, Massachusetts 01610
(508) 793-3362 (phone)
(508) 793-3708 (fax)
http://www.holycross.edu/departments/economics/website
*

All papers in the Holy Cross Working Paper Series should be considered draft versions subject
to future revision. Comments and suggestions are welcome.

Love, Toil, and Health Insurance:
Why American Husbands Retire When They Do

∗

Joshua Congdon-Hohman†
The College of the Holy Cross
Version: June 2013

Abstract
The provision of health insurance has previously been shown to be an important determinant of retirement timing among older Americans, but the existing literature has
largely ignored some aspects of the inter-spousal dependence of health insurance benefits. Specifically, the literature examines only how retirement may affect the health
insurance available to the potential retiree but not how it might affect a spouse’s
options. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, I find that the impact a
husband’s retirement might have on a wife’s health insurance options has a statistically
significant impact on a husband’s rate of retirement that is independent of considerations of his own health insurance options. In households where the wife is the only
one at risk of losing affordable health insurance if the husband retires, the husband is
30 percent less likely to retire than if neither spouse is at risk (a five percentage point
decrease in the retirement rate). Based on these findings, prior research is missing one
avenue that changes to the Medicare eligibility age and health insurance policy changes
through the Affordable Care Act might impact the labor supply of older workers.
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Introduction

Extensive research has examined the important role of a man’s health insurance source on his
retirement decision, but this research has not been extended to account for how a husband’s
retirement might impact the availability of health insurance for a spouse. Though a health
insurance source is often extended to both spouses, there are times when a retirement could
have a divergent impact on each spouse’s access to coverage, such as when one spouse is
Medicare eligible and the other is not. Such scenarios have been ignored by the existing
literature and provide an opportunity to examine the relative importance of each spouse’s
needs when households determine the timing of a husband’s retirement. For other elements
of the retirement decision, researchers have found that the joint benefit of the couple is not
always maximized. For example, Sass, Sun and Webb (2007) and Henriques (2012) found
that the timing of a husband’s initial Social Security claim is more likely to maximize his
own expected benefit rather than the joint benefit of the couple. As changes to federal
health insurance policy are considered and enacted, the answer to this question could have
important implications in regard to labor force exits and, in turn, tax-based revenue and the
fiscal conditions of Medicare and Social Security.
In the analysis using extensive data the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) that follows, I present evidence that a strong relationship exists between a wife’s health insurance
needs and the timing of a husband’s retirement, even independently of husbands’ own health
insurance concerns.1 Consistent with previous research, I find that the retirement rate for
husbands who would lose their low cost health insurance source upon retirement (regardless
of whether their wives would as well) is six to nine percentage points lower than for those who
would not. Not examined in previous research is a similar decline of five percentage points
1

Though the HRS is the richest dataset for Americans in this age range currently available, the number
of respondents does not allow for a parallel analysis of the relationship of spousal health insurance and the
retirement of women due to the small share of women who receive health insurance from their own employers
and even fewer whose husbands also rely on that insurance. The results of a parallel analysis to that which
follows is available in the Appendix but it relies on far too few observations in the categories of interest to
provide trustworthy insights.
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in the rate of retirement among husbands in households where the wife, but not the husband, would lose her current health insurance source without having an observed affordable
alternative.2 These marginal effects represent a 30 to 45 percent decline in retirement rates
and are not statistically different from each other. Interestingly, the impact on retirement
rates of a wife’s health insurance options is dependent on her self-reported health while that
for the husband’s health insurance options is not linked to his health.
In recent years, there have been a number of significant policy changes to the availability
and cost of health insurance that have been enacted and others that have been proposed.
The potential impact of these policy measures depends on the responses of individuals to
changes in health insurance availability. The 2010 health care overhaul legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), was designed to address both the cost
and availability of health insurance to all Americans but especially those who are nearing
Medicare eligibility age. Lower cost health insurance alternatives could affect retirement
timing and would therefore have fiscal implications in the United States. First, retiring
individuals are generally replaced by lower income employees which will negatively affect
income tax revenue for the federal government. Second, the financial outlook for the Social
Security program is closely linked to the expected rates that individuals move from payers
to receivers.3 In recent years, the full benefit eligibility age of Social Security benefits has
been increased to encourage delayed retirement but no similar changes have been made to
the Medicare qualifications. The projected impact of the new health care legislation could
be substantially different depending on whether the needs of younger spouses are considered.
The legislation’s goal of making the private, non-group health insurance markets more acces2

Appendix Section A presents a basic theoretical example of the problem facing the household and what
is missing from previous work on this topic.
3
Though Social Security benefits are designed to have actuarially fair benefit adjustments for those who
retire before or after the normal retirement age, Coile and Gruber (2001) found that there is a small benefit
disincentive to working between the ages of 55 and 61 and a large benefit penalty to working between the
ages of 65 and 69 for the median male worker. The only benefit reductions for the median male worker that
were found to be actuarially fair were for those between 62 and 64 but even those where unfair to almost
half of individuals at age 62. Therefore, delays in retirement should improve the fiscal outlook of the Social
Security program.
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sible and affordable could have implications as households are given access to less expensive
alternatives to employer provided health insurance (EPHI). Similarly, recent proposals to
change the Medicare eligibility age to 67 (an important proposal in the “Ryan Plan” and
other deficit reduction proposals (Kennedy 2011)) could have unexpected implications as
workers may work past reasonable ages in order for their spouses to attain Medicare eligibility age. Such changes, if successful, would have fiscal implications for Social Security
and general tax revenue that may be underestimated based on the methodology of previous
research, especially given the increased reliance on non-group, private insurance and Medicare due to the declining rate that employers are offering health insurance to their potential
retirees.
Though previous research has consistently found a link between employer provided health
insurance (EPHI) offers and various labor decisions, including retirement, the empirical
strategies have been limited to examining just an individual circumstances and not that of
a spouse. Papers by Madrian (1994), Karoly and Rogowski (1994), Gruber and Madrian
(1995), Rogowski and Karoly (2000), and Blau and Gilleskie (2001) all found a strong
link between men’s retiree health insurance (RHI) offers and their retirement hazard using reduced-form analyses, but none tested the impact of possible changes to wives’ health
insurance status.4 Similarly, recent extensions in this literature examining the frequency
of “joint” or coordinated retirement within dual-earning households by Blau and Gilleskie
(2006) and Kapur and Rogowski (2007) also do not account for the influence of spouses’
health insurance needs on each individual’s decision to retire.5 Most recently, Kapur and
Rogowski (2011) examined differences in the role of health insurance on the retirement decisions of men and women. Though they found an impact of both one’s insurance source and
4

Gruber and Madrian (2002) provide a thorough review of the literature and findings, including a
number of papers that use structural models to analyze retirement decisions and incorporate individuals’
health insurance, but not that of their spouses if they retire. Most prominently, the studies using structural
models to identify the role of health insurance in the decision to retire include Gustman and Steinmeier
(1994), Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1994), Rust and Phelan (1997), and French and Jones (2011).
5
Kapur and Rogowski (2007) do find that the propensity of simultaneous retirements more than doubles
if wives possess RHI, which suggests an important role for health insurance in the timing of retirement within
households.
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that of a spouse, their approach treated a spouse’s employer health insurance offers primarily
as an alternative source for the potential retiree. As in other previous research, they did not
account for how a retirement might impact the health insurance availability of the spouse
directly. Additionally, Kapur and Rogowski (2011) examine only potential retirees prior to
Medicare eligibility and do not account for the potential eligibility of a spouse.
Rogowski and Karoly (2000) provide a good example of the common empirical strategy
in the literature which examines men’s current health insurance sources and the relationship
of each to retirement rates. Specifically, they identify five health insurance source categories:
EPHI and no RHI offer, EPHI and RHI offer, EPHI and do not know if RHI offer, no EPHI
but other private or public health insurance coverage, and no insurance. Health insurance
from a spouse’s employer is presumably included as an “other” form of private coverage, but
nowhere do the authors account for the potential impact of a man’s retirement on his spouse.
Though spouses’ insurance coverage is usually shared, the rules of Medicare eligibility create
a discontinuity for spouses of different ages that is not captured by empirical models like
those used by Rogowski and Karoly (2000). Due to this omission, the existing literature
is not fully capturing the impact of employer provided health insurance. In the analysis
that follows, I will use cases where the impact of a husband’s retirement differ for each
spouse to identify the degree to which households independently consider the impact for
each household member.6
One previous study has attempted to address the effect of the inter-spousal health insurance dependency. In trying to isolate the affect of Medicare on mens’ retirement, Madrian
and Beaulieu (1998) use the difference in ages between spouses to proxy for differences
in health insurance availability upon retirements. Madrian and Beaulieu (1998) found an
increase in the retirement hazard of 55 to 69 year old men with Medicare eligible wives
compared to those whose wives are not Medicare eligible. Because the Census data used
in the study did not include health insurance data, it was unable to identify the size of
6

Appendix Section A presents a basic theoretical example of the problem facing the household and what
is missing from previous work on this topic.
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this influence or compare it to that of the husband’s health insurance options because they
cannot separately identify those who are constrained by the Medicare qualification age (i.e.
those without RHI) and those who are unconstrained. The wealth of detailed data in the
HRS allows for the estimation of the impact of cross-spouse health insurance dependency
while also controlling for factors other than age that may influence the decision to retire.
Section 2 discusses the health insurance options and current trends for near-retirement
married couples in the United States. Section 3 describes the Health and Retirement Study,
the sample used, and definitions of key elements for the analysis that follows. Section 4
discusses the general methodology used and addresses some concerns raised in the existing
literature. Section 5 presents the main results and a number of specification checks. Section 6
concludes.

2

Health Insurance and Retirement: Background

Health insurance provision for working age Americans is centered around EPHI. The majority
of workers receive health insurance from either their own or their spouses’ employers. In most
working couples, both spouses have health insurance through the same employer’s plan due
to the fact that most group health plans are available to both spouses in a household.7 When
Americans reach 65 years of age, they become eligible for the federal government’s health
insurance program, called Medicare, as long as they have worked ten years in a qualifying
job (which most do). Unlike most group health insurance plans that employers might offer
to their current and former employees, one’s eligibility for Medicare only can be extended to
a spouse if that spouse also meets the minimum age requirement (currently 65). Medicare is
available prior to that age only for those with qualifying disabilities. Based on the fact that
wives are on average two to three years younger than their husbands, the rules of Medicare
7

In near-retirement aged households where the husband is working and both spouses report employer
provided health insurance (EPHI), over 87 percent of spouses are on the same plan. Sixty-nine percent of
households have a plan through the husband’s employer and 18 percent through the wife’s. Percentages are
based on the author’s calculations using the 1992 wave of the Health and Retirement Study.
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imply that a large share of wives do not qualify at the same time as their husbands.8
If workers choose to retire before they reach 65 years of age, they have a number of
possible outcomes. For some, their employers offer to continue to provide health insurance
to retirees who have worked for the employer for a certain number of years. I refer to this
as an offer of retiree health insurance (RHI). The level of premium subsidization depends on
the employer’s specific benefits but, in general, these programs are retirees’ least expensive
option due to the risk pooling over all of an employer’s employees. Under most RHI plans,
spouses of retirees can also be covered, though again, with different levels of subsidization.
If retirees do not have an offer of RHI, they may remain on their former employer’s health
insurance plan for 18 months following separation of employment but they will pay the full
cost of the insurance (plus a two percent administration fee). This is commonly referred
to as “COBRA” benefits (after the federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1985 which granted this benefit). The availability of EPHI and RHI has declined in
recent decades as fewer employers are offering these benefits to their employees. According
to a 2007 survey of employers, the percentage offering EPHI is down from 69 percent in
2000 to 60 percent in 2007 (Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Education
Trust 2007). Similarly, a larger study using Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
found that only one-quarter of private-sector employees were working at firms that offered
retiree health benefits in 2003 compared to 32 percent in 1997 (Buchmueller, Johnson and
Lo Sasso 2006).
Private, non-group health insurance is one alternative to employer-provided health insurance. It is hard to estimate the average cost of such plans because of the high variability in
the terms of each policy but they tend to be more expensive than employer-provided health
plans with higher premiums, deductibles, and co-payments for services. Until recently, insurance companies in most states retained the option to deny coverage to individuals whom
they deem too risky or to limit benefits for pre-existing conditions. Examination of insurance
8

For a distribution of the gap in ages between spouses in the Health and Retirement Study, see Appendix
Figure 1.
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companies’ offer rates have found that companies reject 10 to 14 percent of all applicants
(Pauly and Nichols 2002, Merlis 2005) and up to 37 percent of those with pre-existing conditions (Pollitz, Sorian and Thomas 2001). The ACA addresses the problems of accessibility
and limited coverage by prohibiting health insurance companies from using previous health
issues when evaluating an application and by standardizing coverage in the newly established
health insurance “Exchanges” (Kaiser Family Foundation 2011).
If near-retirement aged individuals choose to go without insurance, they face higher
medical costs on average than younger Americans, with much higher variability. Tabulations
from the MEPS show the 2005 mean medical expenditure for individuals between 55 and 64
years of age to be over fifty percent higher than for individuals between the ages of 45 and
54 at $5923 and $3775, respectively.9 Under the ACA, those who choose to go uninsured
could also face a financial penalty. The penalty for not maintaining “minimum essential
coverage” would start at $95 or one percent of income in 2014 and increase to $695 or 2.5
percent of income in 2016 with cost of living adjustments made after 2016 (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2011).

3

Data, Definitions, and Descriptive Analysis

The analysis that follows uses detailed longitudinal data on a nationally representative sample of American households from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The initial cohort
of the HRS included households where at least one member was between the ages of 51 and
61 in 1992. A new cohort, labeled the War Baby Cohort, was added in 1998 and includes
households in which one spouse was between the ages of 51 and 56 at the time of their first
interview. The HRS includes data from re-interviews that occur every two years and the
results will be based on the 1992 through the 2006 interview waves. The data used in this
study are available from the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and
9

This calculation is similar to an earlier calculation by Gruber and Madrian (1996). MEPS data is
available through the U.S. Department of Human Services’ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality at
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/index.jsp.
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the RAND Center for the Study of Aging (see St. Clair (2008) for a description of the RAND
data files).
The sample from the HRS used in the following analysis will be restricted in a number
of ways. There are 6,875 households represented in the HRS where at least one household
member is age eligible for one of the two cohorts identified above. Those households are
interviewed a total of 34,440 times. Table 1 itemizes the sample restrictions and the number
of households and observations that remain after each. The sample is limited to only married
couples in order to focus on the inter-dependence of health insurance. To focus on the act of
retirement, the sample is further limited to only households where the husband is working
and has not previously retired at the time of the initial interview.10 The latter restriction
is based on the concern that jobs following a retirement reversal may not be similar to preretirement jobs and that those who have retired previously might have unobserved differences
from those who are considering retirement for the first time. Those who are self-employed are
also excluded due to the complicated relationship between benefits and employment when
one is running his own business.
The final general restriction on the sample is that one of the spouses in each household
must report health insurance from a current employer. This restriction is made in part
to address endogeneity concerns in regard to employees selecting into jobs that provide
health insurance due to a greater valuation of that benefit. The selection concern will be
discussed further in Section 4 below. Ultimately, the analysis sample includes data from
3,044 independent households and 8,417 observations (or 2.75 observations per household)
after a number of observations and households are lost due to data availability. Though not
representative of the whole population, the sample does represent those who are most likely
to respond to changes in health insurance policy and therefore the population of interest for
the questions being addressed in this study.
Past literature has used varying definitions of retirement (see Karoly and Rogowski (1994)
10

Re-entry is quite common as shown by Maestas (2010) and Congdon-Hohman (2006).
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for a discussion of various definitions). This study defines retirement as moving from a working, non-retired classification in the current wave (full-time or part-time work) to a retired
labor force status in the following wave (partial or full retirement). Following the methodology used in the RAND data files and many other studies, the identification of retirement
is based on the hours and weeks worked by a respondent and their self-identified retirement
status. Those who work full-time (defined as 35 hours or more per week and at least 36
weeks in the last year) will not be considered retired regardless of their self-designation.
Those working part-time will be identified as retired if they self-identify as “retired” and
identified as not retired if they do not. Finally, anyone not working and reporting being
“retired” will be identified as retired while those not working and not identifying themselves
as retired (the unemployed, disabled, and those not in the labor force but not retired) will
be excluded from the sample.11
It is important to carefully categorize the health insurance circumstances of a couple and
how I define expectations for health insurance provision if the husband were to retire between
the current and the following wave. Since I am studying the link between health insurance
and labor force transitions, it is important to identify alternative sources of insurance that
may not be linked to continued employment. Affordable alternatives to EPHI from the
husband’s employer include offers of RHI, Medicare, or EPHI through a wife’s employer.
Therefore, I will identify a husband as “at risk” of losing his low-cost health insurance upon
retirement if he reports that his employer offers EPHI but does not offer RHI, his wife does
not receive EPHI from her current or former employer, and he will be under 65 as of the
next wave. All three conditions must hold in order for a husband to be classified as “at
risk.” Similarly, I will identify a wife as “at risk” if her current health insurance source is
her husband’s employer, that employer does not offer RHI, and she will be under 65 years
11

A weakness of this definition is that an individual working part-time can change their classification to
“retired” without changing their work level since the difference between the two categories is purely based
on self-reported retirement status. The same is not true for a full-time worker since the definition does not
allow a full-time worker to be classified as “retired.” The results are generally similar to the findings below
using different definitions of retirement such as considering only “full-time work” as a non-retired status or
full-retirement as the only retired status.
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of age at the time of the next wave.12
Table 2 lists the qualifications one must have to be classified as “at risk” and the percent
of the examined sample that is potentially at risk based on each. Within the analysis sample
described above, the age qualification only makes up a small part of the risk categorization
as most respondents in the analysis sample will be under 65 years of age in the following
wave (91 percent of men and 95 percent of women) and thus assumed to be ineligible for
Medicare.13 Amongst the men, almost eighty percent identify their employer as their health
insurance source with thirty percent not being offered retiree health coverage. Sixty-two
percent of the men in the analysis sample do not report a spouse having EPHI from her own
employer and thus does not appear to have her employer’s insurance as an alternative to his
own employer’s (more on this in a moment). Overall, 20.2 percent of the men in the analysis
sample are identified as at risk. The numbers are similar for women except that their risk
is primarily determined by whether they rely on their husband’s employer who offers health
insurance only to current employees. About 21 percent of wives report health insurance
through such a source and the final percentage of women deemed at risk is reduced slightly
to about 20 percent when the 65 years of age restriction is added.
One weakness of the HRS is that it does not ask respondents whether they have declined
EPHI from their employer. Therefore some individuals may be identified as “at risk” despite
the fact that wives’ employers offer EPHI to their employees if those offers were not accepted.
These occurrences should be relatively rare as prior research by Buchmueller and Valletta
(1999) has shown that EPHI from a husband’s employer makes it significantly less likely
that a wife will seek out employment with the same benefit even when conditioning on fulltime employment. Regardless, these instances of misclassification should bias our results
toward zero since individuals who are not truly at risk of losing their health insurance upon
12

The assumption that wives are eligible for RHI if the husband reports RHI is based on survey results
that find this to be the case 91 percent of the time (Kaiser Family Foundation 2002).
13
The use of age 65 in the following wave as the cutoff for defining risk is adjusted to incorporate the
possibility that COBRA continuation benefits as an insurance bridge from the husband’s retirement to their
65th birthday and Medicare eligibility in Appendix Section C.
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retirement are classified as “at risk.” If a wife’s employer offers EPHI, the results of past
studies suggest that a husband would be more likely to retire. Therefore, any real negative
impact on retirement rates due to the risk of losing health insurance will be somewhat masked
by those who are retiring at the same rate as those identified as “not at risk” due to the
unaccounted for alternatives.
Though husbands and wives have similar rates of being categorized as “at risk,” there
is some variation within the household. The first column of Table 3 presents the rates
that husbands and wives are identified as being “at risk” in an observation wave. Though
each spouse has similar individual rates of risk (between 20 and 21 percent), the risk is
only shared about 85 percent of the time. The husband is alone at risk and the wife is
alone at risk within the household in about three percent of the analysis sample each while
17.5 percent of the sample includes households where both spouses are at risk.14 The second
column of Table 3 provides retirement rates by risk categorization. The husband’s retirement
rate is relatively similar in households where the husband alone or both spouses may lose
their health insurance if he retires but is much higher if only the wife is at risk. This
suggests that a wife’s health insurance circumstances have less influence than the husband’s
on the timing of a husband’s retirement and may be in the opposite direction. I test in
the analysis that follows whether this continues to be true when other demographic and
household characteristics are taken into account.
A look at characteristics across risk groupings will help further elucidate how these groups
are defined. Table 4 examines the mean values for each of the four exclusive categories and
identifies any statistical differences between each “at risk” category and the case where
neither spouse is identified as at risk. The preclusion of risk for those who will be 65 or older
leads to differences in age for each at risk category when compared to those where neither
14

Not reported in this table are the transitions for households over time. Of the households in the sample,
over one-fourth are classified as having both spouses at risk, almost 14 percent as having the wife only at
risk, and 7 percent as having the husband only at risk at some point in the observation period. Many of
these households (6.5 percent of the total) change at risk categories over time, with the largest percentage
observed in the both at risk and wife only at risk categories.
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spouse is identified as at risk. In household’s where only the husband is at risk, age plays
less of a critical role in defining risk since women tend to be the same age or younger than
their husbands. Here, other forms of coverage play a larger role in differentiating the risk
within the household. Since Medicare eligibility due to a disability is one such coverage, a
larger proportion of wives report poor or fair health in the case of this type of risk than in
the other categories. Additionally, households where the spouse is retired are more likely to
be identified as at risk since a retired wife cannot provide an alternative health insurance
source for the household. Other demographic differences include differences in the pension
offer rates and educational attainment of the spouses across risk groups.15

4

Empirical Methodology

Like much of the literature referenced earlier, this paper focuses on reduced form analysis to
study the relationship of health insurance and retirement decisions. Though there is also a
large literature that employs a structural approach to similar questions, I have opted for the
reduced form approach primarily for its simplicity and clarity. Previous structural models
are extremely complex without introducing the wife’s insurance needs to the analysis. As
Kapur and Rogowski (2007) stated in their analysis of joint retirement, the interpretive
advantages of a reduced-form analysis outweigh the potential predictive gains available with
a structural model, which I believe is particularly true when looking at a complex question
like this one for the first time.
Though health insurance offers have been used extensively as an independent variable
in prominent economic studies of labor force decisions, there is a question as to the appropriateness of using these offers in reduced-form studies due to concerns over its possible
endogeneity. Specifically, endogeneity may be a concern if those with a preference for early
15

Generally, those households with some risk have lower educational attainment levels and lower pension
offer rates. The differences in the pension offer rates between at risk categories is driven by differences in
the offer rates of defined benefit plans. Defined benefit plans are offered at similar rates in both the at risk
and neither at risk categories, but at much lower rates in the cases where only one spouse is at risk.

13

retirement select into jobs that offer RHI. Additionally, RHI may be correlated with other,
unobserved qualities of a job. Recently, a number of researchers have rejected the endogeneity concern when conditioning on offers of EPHI both on a practical basis and with
specification checks. Kapur and Rogowski (2007) make three main arguments for not being
concerned about the possible endogeneity of retiree health insurance. First, Gustman and
Steinmeier (2001) and Schur, Berk, Wilensky and Gagnon (2004) provide evidence that individuals are not well informed about their retiree health benefit packages, which suggests
a lack of planning for early retirement. Second, most employers require ten years or more
of tenure to qualify for RHI, which would require job changes prohibitively far in advance
of an expected retirement (Kaiser Family Foundation and Hewitt Associates 2004). Third,
retirement planning is difficult because retiree health insurance has been scaled back dramatically in the last two decades and thus, there is no guarantee that RHI will still be available
when an individual retires. Unlike pensions which are insured through the federal government, no legal requirement or guarantee exists to maintain retiree health benefits offered
before retirement. Additionally, Strumpf (2010) conducted a number of specification checks
to support her use of RHI as an independent variable and found no evidence that RHI was
endogenous conditional on offers of EPHI.16 To address these concerns, I limit the sample
studied to those households where at least one spouse receives EPHI from a current employer
and include a specification using a number of job characteristics to control for job quality.
Additionally, the analysis is repeated for various subsamples in an attempt to address other
concerns regarding possible unobserved variation that may be correlated with risk categories.
In the section that follows, I present the results from three parallel probit analyses examining the retirement of a husband between the current wave (time t) and the following wave
(time t+1) with household-wave pairs as the observation level.17 In the baseline specification
(Specification 1), the only health insurance variable included is the husband’s risk of losing
low-cost coverage if he retires before the following wave. With this specification, households
16
Strumpf’s robustness checks included reanalysis on subsamples of those with over twelve years of tenure
and those over four years from retirement when first observed.
17
I cluster observations at the household level in order to report the correct standard errors.
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where only the wife is at risk of losing her health insurance upon a husband’s retirement are
included with the control group along with households where neither spouse is at risk. This
specification is consistent with the analyses done in previous research. The second specification (Specification 2) adds a control for whether the wife alone is at risk of losing her health
insurance if her husband retires before the following wave. This specification is meant to
address the question of whether households include the wife’s health insurance circumstances
when deciding on the timing of the husband’s retirement. Additionally, the control group
is more logically limited to only those households where neither spouse is at risk of losing
his or her health insurance if the husband retires. The third specification (Specification 3)
separately identifies households where both spouses, only the husband, or only the wife may
lose their low-cost health insurance, which allows me to examine the relative importance of
each spouse’s risk. The following equations present the specifications more formally:

P (RETH,t+1 ) = Φ (α0 + α1 HIH,t + α4 XB,t + α5 Wt )

(1)

P (RETH,t+1 ) = Φ (β0 + β1 HIH,t + β2 HIWO,t + β4 XB,t + β5 Wt )

(2)

P (RETH,t+1 ) = Φ (γ0 + γ1 HIB,t + γ2 HIHO,t + γ3 HIWO,t + γ4 XB,t + γ5 Wt )

(3)

In these specifications, RETH,t+1 is an indicator for the husband’s (H) retirement before
the next wave (t + 1), HIH,t indicates whether the husband is “at risk” of losing his health
insurance if he retires before the next wave (regardless of his wife’s risk) based on his current
health insurance source (at time t) and age at the time of the next wave (at time t + 1),
HIHO,t and HIWO,t indicate that only the husband (HO) or only the wife (WO) is at risk,
and HIB,t indicates both spouses are at risk. The XB,t variable represents additional factors
(as measured in the current wave, with the exception of age) that may be associated with
a husband’s decision to retire. Included in X are the wife’s current retirement status, the
household’s non-housing wealth, each spouse’s level of educational attainment, and each
spouse’s age at the time of the next wave. Additionally, X includes indicators for whether
the husband has a pension plan from his employer, whether each spouse will be between
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62 and 64 years of age or age 65 and older at the next wave, and whether each spouse
currently rates their health as poor or fair (on a five point scale).18 Wt represents a series of
dummy variables for each wave of the HRS and is included to capture any time trends in the
dependent variable.19 Additional specifications include other factors as control variables.
The results that follow are presented as mean marginal effects (MMEs) rather than probit
coefficients or marginal effects at the mean. Mean marginal effects are simply the average
of the calculated marginal effects of a change in the variable of interest (from zero to one
if binary or a one unit change if continuous) for each individual in the sample if all other
covariates are as reported. By contrast, marginal effects at the mean are the calculated
marginal effects if all covariates are evaluated at their mean value. The marginal effects
at specific valuations of the key independent variables are also provided for comparison
purposes.

5

Estimation Results

Table 5 presents the results from the probit analyses outlined in the previous section.
Columns 1 through 3 present the mean marginal effects (MMEs) when other covariates
(the above X’s) are excluded. The results in these columns reflect the surprising pattern
from Table 3 that the MMEs of both spouses being at risk and the husband alone being
at risk are of a similar magnitude, while the wife’s sole risk is associated with a significant
increase in the retirement rate. Again, in order to be classified as “at risk” of losing health
insurance if the husband retires, a husband must report EPHI but not RHI, not have a wife
with EPHI from her own employer, and be under 65 years of age in the next wave. For wives
to be at risk, they must report their husbands’ employer as their source of EPHI with no
18

Replacing the pension term with separate indicators for the type of pension plan (defined contribution,
defined benefit, or both) results in slightly smaller estimates but do not change the findings. Those results
are shown in Appendix Table 4.
19
The mean marginal effects (MME’s) for the wave indicators from the probit analysis are omitted in
the tables below in order to save space. The MME’s of the wave dummies are generally not significant at
traditional levels.
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offer of RHI and be under 65 in the next wave.
Columns 4 through 6 of Table 5 duplicate the estimations presented in columns 1 through
3 with the addition of covariates. Column 4 (based on Specification (1)) presents the results
if a wife’s health insurance risk is not explicitly considered. A husband’s “risk” of losing
affordable health insurance if he retires is associated with a 6.6 percentage point decline in
the retirement rate, which is significant at the one percent level. Given that the sample
retirement rate is 16.6 percent, this implies a 40 percent drop. The seven percentage point
decline in husbands’ retirement rate if they stand to lose their health insurance is consistent
with previous estimates of the impact of retiree health insurance found in Madrian (1994)
(seven to 15 percent decline in likelihood of retiring before a man reaches 65), Karoly and
Rogowski (1994) (eight percentage point decline in retirement rate for men without RHI),
Rogowski and Karoly (2000) (a eleven percentage point increase in the predicted retirement
probability with an offer of RHI), and Blau and Gilleskie (2006) (eight percentage point
difference in labor force exit for men with and without RHI).
Column 5 of Table 5 presents the results for Specification (2), which adds an indicator
for the wife only being at risk. Despite separating the households where the wife alone is at
risk of losing her health insurance from the comparison group, the MME of the husband’s
risk is left unchanged. The addition of covariates changes the MME of the wife’s exclusive
“risk” from positive to significantly negative since this category is no longer proxying for
the case where the husband will be over 65 years of age in the next wave and thus highly
likely to retire.20 Taken together, these results support the estimates the previous literature
examining the impact of a husband’s own health insurance concerns but also show that
households consider wives’ risk of losing health insurance independently when choosing the
timing of retirements which has been not been previously identified. As discussed earlier,
the trend in RHI offers may increase the importance of this omission in the near future
20

The fact that the health insurance risk MMEs change when other factors are included may raise concerns
about the endogeneity of the health insurance indicators. Appendix Section B explores this question and
finds the addition of the husband’s age to be the most significant factor in the differences in the MMEs
reported in Table 5.
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depending on the implementation of the ACA and any changes to Medicare eligibility.21
To identify whether each spouse’s health insurance risk is equally weighted in household
decision making, I next separately identify households where only the husband is at risk
and both spouses are at risk (Specification (3)). The results in column 6 of Table 5 show
the MME of all the risk indicators are negative and significant at the five percent level.
The indicator for the husband’s sole risk (a negative ten percentage point marginal effect on
average) is about 60 percent larger than the MME for both at risk (negative six percentage
points). Despite the fact that the husband’s sole risk MME is almost twice that of the wife’s
(negative 5.2 percentage points), the hypothesis that the two MMEs are equal cannot be
rejected at the ten percent level based on the results of a Wald test. The larger MME for
husband’s sole risk exemplifies the issue of unobserved health insurance offers from a wife’s
employer and the resulting underestimates of the impact of health insurance risk in the cases
of wife only and both spouses at risk. In those cases, an accepted offer from the husband’s
employer may mask an unaccepted offer from the wife’s employer. This is less likely in the
case where the husband only is at risk since the wife’s health insurance source has been
identified as non-employer based and therefore the wife is unlikely to have such an offer.
The MMEs of the other covariates are generally as one would expect based on previous
literature. Table 5 shows that having a currently retired wife, a pension plan and each
additional year of age have a positive association with future retirement and are significant
at the one percent level.22 Reaching the key ages of 62 (when he first qualifies for reduced
Social Security benefits) and 65 (when he becomes eligible for Medicare and unreduced
Social Security benefits) before the next wave are also associated with large increases in the
retirement rate. Though mostly insignificant, a wife’s age at the next wave is also associated
with an increase in the rate of retirement while key milestone ages of 62 and 65 for wives are
21

Appendix Table 5 presents the results if wives’ retirements are examined instead of husbands’ retirement. As discussed earlier, the small number of cases where a husband is alone at risk makes these results
uninformative.
22
Pension benefits and spousal retirements could potentially have similar endogeneity concerns as those
discussed above in regard to retiree health insurance offers. The inclusion of these controls has only a minimal
impact on the health insurance MMEs that are the focus of this paper.
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negatively associated with a change in the husbands’ retirement rate. If a husband reports
his health as fair or poor, he is significantly more likely to retire, but not if the wife rates
her health as fair or poor.
Though MMEs give an overview of the impact of each risk category by looking at the
average impact over the full sample, it is also interesting to look at the impact of each risk
category at various points in the sample. Table 6 presents the marginal effects for the three
risk categories from Specification (3) evaluated at various values of key covariates with other
covariates valued at their means. The first panel examines the marginal effects for different
age pairings of the couple. At the mean values for those ages (59.4 is rounded to 59 for
husbands and 56.2 is rounded to 56 for wives), the marginal effects are slightly lower than
the MMEs reported in Table 5, though all still significant at the five percent level. For each
spouse, the marginal effects for all risk identifiers decrease as age increases by one standard
deviation but the scale of change is much smaller as the wife ages compared to the husband.
The marginal effects for all risk identifiers decrease by over two percentage points with each
standard deviation change in the husband’s age but decrease by only 0.2 percentage points
for a similar change in the wife’s age. When evaluating the marginal effects of the risk
identifiers at various levels of other key controls, Table 6 shows that their negative impact
is greater for those husbands whose wives are retired, are not offered a pension, and who
report being in fair or poor health. Changes to a wife’s health and the household’s nonhousing wealth have little impact on the marginal effect of the health insurance risk facing
the households.
One reason for the large difference in the MMEs for a husband’s and wife’s sole health
insurance risk may be the differences in financial costs of health care and insurance associated
with each gender. In the age range examined in this study, women tend to be healthier than
men and to have lower medical costs which result in lower non-group insurance premiums.
If this difference is an important factor that has been missed in the above analysis, I would
expect that the marginal effect of the risk of losing health insurance for women would be more
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similar to that of men when differences in health are better controlled for. Table 7 presents
results when interacting the self-reported health measure with the health insurance risk
categories used above. The MME in column 1 are replicated from the original specification
in Table 5. Column 2 presents the results when the health measures are interacted with the
appropriate health insurance risk indicator (e.g. the wife’s sole risk is interacted with the
wife’s health measure). The inclusion of interaction terms has very little impact on the health
insurance MMEs that involve the husband, but has a modest impact on the MME of the
“wife only at risk” category. The inclusion of interaction terms decreases the magnitude of
this MME by one percentage point and reduces the significance below traditional thresholds
(from a significance level of five percent to just above ten percent). The opposite is true of
the MMEs of the interaction terms.23 Though they are generally negative, only the MME
of the interaction term of the wife’s self-rated health and the wife only at risk identifier is
significant at traditional levels. This pattern seems to suggest that households are concerned
about the husband’s health insurance generally but consider the wife’s primarily when she is
in poor health. This pattern does not persist if other, more quantitative measures of health
are used in place of self-rated health quality measures (see Appendix Section D where the
existence of health conditions and hospital stays are substituted for self-rated health).
Given that the distinction between risk categories are primarily identified by the relative
ages of spouses, one may be concerned that couples with different age gaps may have other
differences that are not captured in the controls. If this is the case, the fact that a large
age difference between spouses will result in a higher likelihood of being identified as at risk,
our individualized risk categories may be simply proxying for this age difference. To address
this concern, I separately run the primary analysis on two subsamples where the wife is
substantially younger than her husband. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 presents the results of
this analysis. The two subsamples of households are those where the husband is 3 to 5 years
older and those where the husband is 6 years older or more. The results show a pattern which
23

The MMEs and standard errors for interaction terms reported in Table 7 have been adjusted to reflect
the true magnitude of the interaction term’s marginal effect described in Ai and Norton (2003).
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is consistent with earlier results. In these subsamples, households where the wife is at risk of
losing low cost health insurance if the husband retires are six to seven percentage points less
likely to retire than similarly situated families without the risk of losing health insurance.
The impact of the husband’s sole risk is also more pronounced in these subsamples. These
results suggest that the risk variables are not proxying for the age gap between spouses.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 present the results of an alternative approach to identify
the impact of health insurance through a spouse. Rather than use the data as a panel,
I instead take a cross-section of data at the time when health insurance access for each
spouse if a husband retires will be most divergent: before and after the husband becomes
Medicare eligible. For each household, I take only the wave before the husband turns 65 and
identify whether he has retired before the next observation wave. Column 3 presents the
results when a probit analysis continues to be used. Since the husband will be 65 when next
observed, he cannot be “at risk” so his risk variables have been dropped. By limiting the
examination to one risk category, it is now possible to further assure the appropriateness of
our comparison group by using propensity score matching where each observation is matched
by the propensity of the wife being identified as at risk based on the couple’s observable
qualities. Column 4 presents the results of using a propensity score matching approach and
presents the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).24 Using the same controls as in
the earlier analysis other than age categories for the husband, the MME in column 3 and
ATT in column 4 are larger than the 5 percent found in our baseline model and significant
at traditional levels. Though the magnitude is greater, these values are similar to earlier
results in percentage terms since the retirement rate in this subsample is much larger than
the whole sample at just under 43 percent. The 12 to 13 percentage point decrease in the
likelihood of retirement associated with a wife’s risk of losing health insurance represents
about a 30 percent decrease and is consistent with the earlier findings.
24

Observations are matched using the radial approach where the radius is set to 0.1. Propensity scores
are determined based on the same observable qualities used in the primary analysis and meet the balancing
property. The alternative approaches using nearest neighbor and stratified matching provide similar ATT
values.
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To examine the concern that health insurance may be acting as a proxy for job quality,
Table 9 presents the MMEs of a probit analysis when a large number of the husband’s job
characteristics are included. Specifically, I include a number of the husband’s reported job
requirements (the husband reports that his job “always” or “most of the time” includes
“physical effort,” “good eyesight,” “intense concentration,” and “people skills”) and characterizations of his job (the respondent “strongly agrees” or “agrees” that his job’s tasks are
“difficult,” the job has “a lot of stress,” older workers feel “pressure to retire” or are given
“less demanding tasks,” and whether he “enjoys” his work). The sample is limited to waves
3 through 8 due to the fact that questions about the enjoyment of work were not asked in
the second wave of the HRS. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 show very little impact on the key
MMEs when the second wave is dropped from the sample used in the original specification.
Columns 3 through 4 show that though a number of job characteristics are associated with
significant differences in the retirement rate of husbands, their inclusion does not have a
marked effect on the MMEs of the risk indicators. Thus, Table 9 is evidence that health
insurance risk is not acting as a proxy for job quality.

6

Conclusion

Economic literature focusing on the retirement of near-elderly men has largely omitted controls for the health insurance implications of husbands’ retirements for their wives. The
results of this study suggest that households do consider the health insurance circumstances
of both spouses when choosing the timing of a husband’s retirement. I also find that the
risk that a wife might lose the opportunity of low-cost health insurance has a similar impact
on husbands’ rate of retirement as the risk of a husband losing his own insurance, especially
once thoroughly controlling for a wife’s health. In households where the wife is the only one
at risk of losing affordable health insurance if the husband retires, the husband is 30 percent
less likely to retire than if neither spouse is at risk (a five percentage point decrease in the re-
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tirement rate). These findings are similar to a previous finding that husbands are responsive
to their wives’ pension benefits when making individual labor force decisions (Coile 2004)
and counter to other research that has shown men do not fully consider the impact of decisions on their spouses. The implications of these findings for the economic modeling of
household decision making is that both spouses’ financial and health insurance circumstances
must be considered in order to correctly account for the full incentives that individuals face
with regards to health insurance and labor supply. Though the current literature accurately
accounts for a husband’s responsiveness to his own health insurance options, it fails to fully
account for the incentives men face when they have younger, non-Medicare eligible spouses
and no offer of RHI.
If it does not already do so, future policy analysis should take care to incorporate the
effects for both an individual and his or her spouse when evaluating the impact of the
reformed health insurance market and any possible changes to the Medicare program to
improve its financial solvency. If the current trend of declining RHI offer rates continues
or accelerates due to the passage of the ACA or similar legislation, a failure to include the
effects of policy changes on a spouse may underestimate the impact on men’s retirement
rates. For example, new regulations to make private, non-group health insurance more
affordable and accessible will not only move forward the retirement of those who would have
otherwise waited to become eligible for Medicare, but also those who formerly appeared to
be unresponsive to their own health insurance incentives because they were waiting to retire
until their wives turned 65 as well.
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Appendices
A

Theoretical Motivation

Appendix Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of a husband’s labor-leisure optimization problem when health insurance is tied to employment. For ease of analysis, I assume
the wife’s labor supply decision has already been made and the household is choosing the
husband’s labor supply to maximize its utility given the household budget constraint. One
could imagine that this is the result of a common preference approach to family behavior
(such as models based on Samuelson (1956) or Becker (1974)) in which an employment decision for the wife is made first. Alternatively, the optimization problem presented here could
represent the decision faced by a husband in a Nash bargaining framework where each spouse
takes the other’s actions as given. This framework is common in much of the literature on
cooperative family bargaining models.25
In this example, households have some level of income not earned by the husband in the
current period (which may include income earned by the wife) and the value of any benefits
not linked to on-going employment. Husbands can earn a constant wage for each hour of
leisure they relinquish for labor. Because EPHI is usually a benefit offered only to full-time
employees, the representation of the household’s budget constraint is discontinuous at the
point where the husband would be considered a full-time employee. The height of the kink
could be thought of as the cost of non-group health insurance, as the expected additional
medical costs to the household if not insured, or as the amount the household is willing to pay
to avoid the risk of extremely large medical costs due to a negative health shock.26 The solid
black line in Appendix Figure 2 represents the budget constraint for a household where both
25

For a more detailed discussion of the models of household decision making, see Lundberg and Pollack
(1996).
26
Though not represented in Appendix Figure 2, other benefits (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) for fulltime workers would simply increase the size of the kink at full-time work while maintaining the less than
full-time representations of the possible budget constraints.
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spouses rely on the husband’s employer for EPHI. By this, I mean that if the husband were
not to work full-time, both the husband and the wife would be left with the choice between
only high-cost private, non-group health insurance or going uninsured (because they do not
have the options of Medicare, EPHI from the wife’s employer, or RHI from the husband’s
employer).
The size of the kink in the budget constraint depends on how many household members
are dependent on the husband’s EPHI. In couples where the husband has retiree health
insurance coverage, insurance through the wife’s employer, or both spouses are eligible for
Medicare, the budget constraint would be continuous because there is no added value of
working full-time other than additional wages. This scenario is represented in Appendix
Figure 2 as the fully linear budget constraint where the unearned income is the total of noncurrent employment-based income and the value of health insurance for both spouses. The
budget line with a smaller discontinuity represents the case where only one spouse does not
have an alternative health insurance source (for example, when only one spouse is eligible
for Medicare). Prior research has excluded this case when examining the decision of men to
retire.
Based on the depiction in Appendix Figure 2, individuals will maximize their utility (U0
and U1 represent indifference curves where U1 > U0 ) by choosing full-time employment if
both spouses rely on the husband’s employer for health insurance. If the husband becomes
eligible for Medicare and the wife does not, the shape of an individual’s indifference curve
will determine whether the husband would maximize the household utility by continuing to
work full-time or by reducing his labor. As depicted in Appendix Figure 2, a husband who
becomes eligible for Medicare while his wife does not would still maximize the household’s
utility by working full-time. Models that do not include this intermediary case would predict
that the husband would reduce his labor and may construe the lack of that response as
unresponsiveness to health insurance incentives.
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B

Decomposition of the Impact of Covariates on Key
Mean Marginal Effects

The fact that the health insurance risk MMEs change in Table 5 when other factors are
included may raise concerns about the endogeneity of the health insurance indicators. To
answer this concern, the lower panel of Appendix Table 2 shows the contribution of additional
covariate groupings using the values from analogously defined ordinary least squares (OLS)
specifications. The upper panel of Appendix Table 2 presents the equivalent OLS results to
Table 5 and shows the OLS estimates to be very close to the MMEs from the probit analyses.
Using specification (2) as an example, the values in the lower panel were arrived at through
the following series of equations:27
A
A
A
RETH,t+1 = aA
0 + a1 HIH,t + a2 HIWO,t + ε

(4)

B
B
B
B
RETH,t+1 = aB
0 + a1 HIH,t + a2 HIWO,t + a3 XB,t + ε

(5)

x1 = b1 + bh1 HIH,t + bw
1 HIWO,t + ε1

(6)

x2 = b2 + bh2 HIH,t + bw
2 HIWO,t + ε2
..
.
xr = br + bhr HIH,t + bw
r HIWO,t + εr

In the above equations, variables are labelled as in Section 4 where X = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xr ) and
r is the number of additional covariates. Substituting equations (6) into equation (5) and
collecting terms produces the following:

RETH,t+1

!
!
!
r
r
r
r
X
X
X
X
B
h
B
w
B
= bB +
aB
aB
aB
aB
3,k (bk )+ a1 +
3,k (bk ) HIH,t + a2 +
3,k (bk ) HIWO,t + ε +
3,k (εk )
k=1

k=1

k=1

k=1

(7)
27

Though not included in the equations here, wave dummies continue to be included at every stage.
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Therefore, the change in the coefficients of interest can be decomposed as
aA
1

−

aB
1

=

B
aA
2 − a2 =

r 
X
k=1
r
X


h
aB
3,k (bk )

(8)


w
aB
3,k (bk )

k=1

Each term on the right hand side of Equation (8) can be interpreted as the individual impact
of the inclusion of that covariate on the change in the coefficient of interest. For example, the

P
h
B
value for the contribution of the age variables is arrived at by taking the m
j=1 a3,j (bj ) for
the m factors related to age.28 The bottom panel of Appendix Table 2 shows that almost all
of the change in the health insurance risk coefficients is due to the inclusion of age variables
and not spouse’s retirement status, pension, wealth, health or education. If pensions or
education had been large contributors to the difference in the health insurance risk MMEs,
I would be concerned about other factors that this specification is not accounting for that
may be associated with both the decision to retire and health insurance risk. The above
analysis does not imply that health, wealth, pensions and education are not associated with
a husband’s decision to retire, just that their inclusion does not have a major impact on the
coefficients associated with health insurance risk.

C

Incorporating COBRA into the Definition of Heath
Insurance Risk

One might also be concerned that employer continuation benefits have not been included in
the definition of health insurance risk. Under federal law, employers with over 20 employees
are required to allow separated employees who have EPHI to remain in their current health
insurance plan, at 102 percent of the cost, for up to 18 months. This requirement is often referred to as COBRA benefits, named after the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
28

They are husband’s age, wife’s age, husband 65 or over, wife 65 or over, husband 62 to 64, and wife 62
to 64.
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Act of 1985. Forty of the fifty U.S. states have enacted state laws amplifying COBRA by
lowering the employer size requirement.(Kaiser Family Foundation 2007) A few states have
extended the benefits beyond 18 months for all employees in the state.29 Six states have
addressed the concerns of retirees specifically by requiring former employers of retirees who
are near Medicare eligible age to offer continuation coverage until they reach the age of 65.30
Unfortunately, the unrestricted HRS data does not include information on the state that a
respondent lives in. The HRS does provide data on the region in which the respondents live,
but the states enacting additional continuation laws are not localized to any single region.
Generally, the take up rate for those who qualify for COBRA benefits is relatively low, with
just over one in five exercising the option. (Flynn 1994)
Though there is not a direct question in the HRS that asks respondents if they are
taking advantage of COBRA to continue their benefits, the definition of health insurance
risk can be modified to incorporate the possibility that COBRA benefits play a significant
role. Specifically, rather than defining “at risk” as those who depend on EPHI without an
offer of RHI and will still be under 65 years of age when next observed, I lower the cut-off
age by 18 months to 63 years, six months of age in the following wave.31 After that age, a
husband or wife could use COBRA to extend health insurance benefits to age 65 at which
point he or she will be eligible for Medicare. Columns 1 and 2 in Appendix Table 1 replicate
the analysis of a husband’s decision to retire using the modified definitions of risk for each
spouse. Compared to the original results in Table 5, the MMEs for most risk variables
are only slightly different. Overall, the similar importance of husbands’ and wives’ risk in
estimating the likelihood that a husband retires remains true.
29

CT, MA, NH, NJ, NY, TX, MN, ND, SD, CA, and NV extend health insurance benefits to 36 months,
FL to 29 months, and IL to 24 months.
30
They are IL, LA, MD, MO, NH, and OR.
31
For example, someone who is currently 62 (and thus 64 at the next wave) could be deemed at risk under
the original definition but would not be at risk under the definition that incorporates COBRA.
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D

Other Measures of Health

Appendix Table 3 examines the impact if self-rated health is replaced by two alternative
measures of health. In columns 1 and 2, self-rated health is replaced by an indicator for
the existence of a health condition. An individual is identified as having poor health if they
report ever having any of the following health conditions: diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart
problems, or a stroke. Almost one-quarter of the sample has one of these listed conditions
while only ten to 15 percent rate their health as fair or poor. Columns 3 and 4 present the
results if overnight hospital stays in the previous twelve months are used as an indicator
of poor health. Columns 1 and 3 show that the choice of health measures has very little
impact on the MMEs of the health insurance risk variables as the MMEs are similar to those
in Table 5. That said, the existence of a health condition for the wife has a significantly
negative association with a husband’s decision to retire, while her self-rated health and a
hospital stay in the last year do not. When interaction terms are included in columns 2
and 4, their inclusion does not have the same impact as it did in the case of self-rated
health (Table 7).32 Unlike the specification using self-rated health, the MME on the wife’s
sole risk identifier remains significantly negative and the interaction term does not have a
significantly negative MME when either of the two alternative measures of health are used.
The difference in results here depending on which health proxy is used is not new to economic
literature. Bound (1991) discusses the variation in results when using self-reported health or
other health measures in retirement models but do not find one measure to be better than
any other.
32

As with the MME for the interaction terms in Table 7, adjustments have been made to reflect the true
magnitude of the interaction term’s marginal effect as described in Ai and Norton (2003).
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Table 1
Sample Restrictions

General Restrictions:
Age eligible men or men with an age eligible spouse
Married currently and when last interviewed
Currently working and never retired
Not self-employed
Individual or spouse reports EPHI from his or her employer
Data Availability Restrictions:
Non-missing health insurance source information for husband
Non-missing health insurance source information for spouse
Detailed pension data available
No non-missing control variables and weights
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Number of
Households

Number of
Observations

6875
6070
4388
3611
3208

34440
29220
14399
11110
9618

3166
3084
3052
3044

9092
8634
8442
8417

Table 2
Qualifications for “At Risk” of Losing Health Insurance upon a Husband’s Retirement
Percent of
Analysis Sample
Qualifications for husband to be identified as “at risk”:
Husband is under 65 years of age
Husband has EPHI from own employer
Husband has EPHI from own employer but not offered RHI
Wife does not have EPHI from her own employer
All of the above are true

91.0%
79.6%
29.8%
62.2%
20.2%

Qualifications for wife to be identified as “at risk”:
Wife is under 65 years of age
Wife has EPHI from husband’s employer only
Wife has EPHI from husband’s employer but no offer of RHI
All of the above are true

95.0%
55.7%
21.3%
20.3%

Analysis Sample: Married, husband not previously retired and not self-employed, HRS ageeligible, and at least one spouse with EPHI
Note: Values are weighted based on HRS household sampling weights.
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Table 3
Share “At Risk” of Losing Health Insurance and Corresponding Retirement Rates
Categorization of the “Risk” of Share of Sample
Retirement Rate
Losing Health Insurance
in
in
if Husband Retires
All Waves
All Waves
Neither spouse is at risk

76.9%

18.0%

Husband is at risk

20.2%

9.9%

Wife is at risk

20.3%

12.1%

Both spouses are at risk

17.5%

10.1%

Husband is at risk
but not the wife

2.8%

9.1%

Wife is at risk
but not the husband

2.9%

24.2%

Analysis Sample: Married, husband not previously retired and not self-employed, HRS age-eligible,
and at least one spouse with EPHI
Note: Values are weighted based on HRS household sampling weights.
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Table 4
Sample Means by Categorization of a Household’s “Risk” of Losing Health Insurance if the
Husband Retires
Neither
at Risk

Both
at Risk

Husband Only
at Risk

Wife Only
at Risk

Husband’s age

59.4

58.2***

59.0

64.0***

Wife’s age

56.1

55.3***

59.3***

58.4***

Husband is between 62 and 64

19.9%

19.9%

27.3%***

9.5%***

Wife is between 62 and 64

10.4%

8.6%*

6.7%*

35.3%***

Husband is over 65

12.8%

0.0%***

0.0%***

62.5%***

Wife is over 65

6.7%

0.0%***

33.6%***

0.0%***

Husband’s self-rated health is fair or poor

11.5%

13.2%*

18.6%***

15.3%*

Wife’s self-rated health is fair or poor

13.8%

17.6%***

41.9%***

17.8*

Wife is retired

11.5%

11.3%

35.2%***

18.5%***

Husband reports any pension

79.7%

84.4%***

64.4***

68.0%***

Household non-housing wealth in 100k’s (2000 Dollars)

0.201

0.171

0.116

0.189

Husband’s education: less than high school diploma

16.4%

14.2%**

32.4%***

20.4%*

Husband’s education: high school diploma

34.6%

39.1%***

33.6%

37.1%

Husband’s education: less than college degree

20.9%

19.0%

14.6%**

15.3%**

Husband’s education: college degree

27.9%

27.6%

19.4%***

26.9%

Wife’s education: less than high school diploma

13.7%

16.7%***

35.2%***

26.2%***

Wife’s education: high school diploma

33.4%

35.7%

30.4%

35.3%

Wife’s education: less than college degree

24.3%

25.2%

19.4%*

19.6%*

Wife’s education: college degree

20.5%

16.3%***

14.2%**

14.9%**

6613

1276

253

275

Observations

Note: Astericks represent the statistical difference between the associated mean and the mean when
neither spouse is at risk based on a simple t-test: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
Analysis Sample: Married, husband not previously retired and not self-employed, HRS ageeligible, and at least one spouse with EPHI
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Table 5
The Mean Marginal Effects (MMEs) of Both Spouses’ Health Insurance Risk on Husbands’
Retirements

Husband “at risk” of losing health
insurance if he retires

1

2

3

Husband’s
Risk Only

Husband’s
Risk and
Wife’s Nonshared Risk

Fully
Exclusive
Risk
Categories

-0.083***
[0.010]

-0.081***
[0.010]

4

5

6

Husband’s
Risk Only

Husband’s
Risk and
Wife’s Nonshared Risk

Fully
Exclusive
Risk
Categories

-0.066***
[0.012]

-0.066***
[0.011]

Both “at risk” of losing health
insurance if husband retires

-0.079***
[0.010]

-0.061***
[0.012]

Only husband “at risk” of losing
health insurance if he retires

-0.090***
[0.018]

-0.101***
[0.021]

Only wife “at risk” of losing
health insurance if husband retires

0.051*
[0.028]

0.051*
[0.028]

-0.053**
[0.022]

-0.052**
[0.022]

Wife is retired

0.069***
[0.017]

0.070***
[0.017]

0.072***
[0.017]

Husband has a pension plan (DB,
DC, or both)

0.038***
[0.011]

0.038***
[0.011]

0.037***
[0.011]

Husband’s age in years at next
wave (NW)

0.017***
[0.002]

0.017***
[0.002]

0.017***
[0.002]

0.002
[0.001]

0.001
[0.001]

0.001
[0.001]

0.135***
[0.019]

0.134***
[0.019]

0.134***
[0.019]

-0.009
[0.015]

-0.007
[0.015]

-0.007
[0.015]

0.066***
[0.024]

0.075***
[0.025]

0.073***
[0.025]

-0.027
[0.018]

-0.033*
[0.018]

-0.028
[0.019]

0.056***
[0.016]

0.056***
[0.016]

0.056***
[0.016]

Wife’s self-rated health is fair/poor

0.003
[0.014]

0.002
[0.014]

0.004
[0.014]

Real total non-housing
assets (in 100k’s)

-0.004
[0.004]

-0.004
[0.004]

-0.004
[0.004]

Husband’s educational attainment
is less than high school diploma

-0.018
[0.014]

-0.018
[0.014]

-0.018
[0.014]

Husband’s educational attainment
is some college but no degree

-0.003
[0.013]

-0.004
[0.013]

-0.004
[0.013]

Husband’s educational attainment
is college degree or more

-0.018
[0.013]

-0.018
[0.013]

-0.018
[0.013]

Wife’s educational attainment is
less than high school diploma

-0.007
[0.015]

-0.006
[0.015]

-0.005
[0.015]

Wife’s educational attainment is
some college but no degree

-0.009
[0.012]

-0.009
[0.012]

-0.009
[0.012]

Wife’s educational attainment is
college degree or more

-0.019
[0.014]

-0.019
[0.014]

-0.019
[0.014]

8417

8417

8417

Wife’s age in years at NW
Husband will be between 62 & 64
years old at NW
Wife will be between 62 & 64 years
old at NW
Husband will be 65 years old or
older at NW
Wife will 65 years old or older
at NW
Husband’s self-rated health
is fair/poor

Observations

8417

8417

8417

Standard errors in brackets, clustered by household. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. Wave dummies are included in all specifications.
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired, husband is not self-employed,
and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the HRS.
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Table 6
The Marginal Effect of Health Insurance Risk Evaluated at Different Covariate Values
“At Risk” of Losing Health Insurance:
Both Spouses
Marginal
SE
Effect

Husband Only
Marginal
SE
Effect

Wife Only
Marginal
SE
Effect

Husband’s Age/Wife’s Age
At ages 55/50
At ages 55/56
At ages 55/62
At ages 59/50
At ages 59/56 (mean)
At ages 59/62
At ages 64/50
At ages 64/56
At ages 64/62

-0.036***
-0.038***
-0.040***
-0.054***
-0.056***
-0.059***
-0.078***
-0.080***
-0.083***

[0.007]
[0.008]
[0.008]
[0.011]
[0.011]
[0.012]
[0.017]
[0.017]
[0.018]

-0.052***
-0.055***
-0.059***
-0.080***
-0.085***
-0.089***
-0.123***
-0.128***
-0.132***

[0.010]
[0.010]
[0.011]
[0.015]
[0.016]
[0.017]
[0.026]
[0.026]
[0.028]

-0.029**
-0.030**
-0.032**
-0.043**
-0.045**
-0.047**
-0.063**
-0.065**
-0.067**

[0.011]
[0.012]
[0.013]
[0.018]
[0.018]
[0.019]
[0.027]
[0.028]
[0.029]

Wife’s Retired?
No
Yes

-0.054***
-0.073***

[0.011]
[0.015]

-0.081***
-0.114***

[0.015]
[0.024]

-0.043**
-0.059**

[0.018]
[0.025]

Husband has a pension?
No
Yes

-0.047***
-0.058***

[0.010]
[0.012]

-0.070***
-0.088***

[0.014]
[0.016]

-0.038**
-0.047**

[0.015]
[0.019]

Couple’s Self-Rated Health
Both “Good,” “Very Good,”
or “Excellent”
Husband only “Fair” or “Poor”
Wife only “Fair” or “Poor”
Both “Fair” or “Poor”

-0.054***

[0.011]

-0.082***

[0.015]

-0.043**

[0.018]

-0.069***
-0.055***
-0.070***

[0.015]
[0.012]
[0.015]

-0.107***
-0.083***
-0.109***

[0.022]
[0.017]
[0.023]

-0.056**
-0.044**
-0.057**

[0.023]
[0.018]
[0.024]

Non-Housing Wealth
in 2000 Dollars
$5,513 (10th Percentile)
$22,825 (25th Percentile)
$70,129 (50th Percentile)
$203,982 (75th Percentile)
$449,518 (90th Percentile)

-0.056***
-0.056***
-0.056***
-0.056***
-0.056***

[0.011]
[0.011]
[0.011]
[0.011]
[0.011]

-0.085***
-0.085***
-0.085***
-0.085***
-0.084***

[0.016]
[0.016]
[0.016]
[0.016]
[0.016]

-0.045**
-0.045**
-0.045**
-0.045**
-0.045**

[0.018]
[0.018]
[0.018]
[0.018]
[0.018]

Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by household. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
Note: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. All marginal effects evaluated at the mean
of covariates unless otherwise specified.
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired, husband
is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the HRS
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Table 7
Analysis of Husbands’ Retirements with Interactions of Health Measures
1
2
Original
Interactions
Specification Specification
Both “At Risk” of Losing Health
Insurance if Husband Retires

-0.061***
[0.012]

-0.058***
[0.015]

Only Husband “At Risk” of Losing Health
Insurance if He Retires

-0.101***
[0.021]

-0.102***
[0.023]

Only Wife “At Risk” of Losing Health
Insurance if Husband Retires

-0.052**
[0.022]

-0.04
[0.025]

Husband’s Health Measure Poor

0.056***
[0.016]

0.056***
[0.017]

0.004
[0.014]

0.01
[0.016]

Wife’s Health Measure Poor
Interaction of Husband having a Poor Self-rated
Health with Joint Health Insurance Risk

-0.009
[0.040]

Interaction of Wife having a Poor Self-rated
Health with Joint Health Insurance Risk

-0.020
[0.031]

Interaction of Husband’s Poor Self-rated Health
with Husband Only Health Insurance Risk

-0.024
[0.055]

Interaction of Wife’s Poor Self-rated Health
with Wife Only Health Insurance Risk

-0.078**
[0.040]

Additional Covariates
Observations

Yes
8417

Yes
8417

Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by household. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%
Note 1: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. Wave dummies included in all
specifications. Additional covariates include whether a wife is retired, whether a husband
has a pension, household wealth, and each spouse’s age, age category, and education level.
Note 2: MMEs for interaction terms have been adjust based on Ai and Norton (2003).
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired,
husband is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort
of the HRS
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Table 8
Analysis using Different Subsamples
1
Panel: Wife 3 to 5
Years Younger
Mean
MME

2
Panel: Wife 6 Years
or More Younger
Mean
MME

3
4
Cross-sectional: Husband
Age 63 or 64
Mean
MME
ATT

Both “At Risk”

0.158

-0.074***
[0.025]

0.125

-0.073***
[0.026]

0

Only Husband “At Risk”

0.021

-0.184***
[0.024]

0.024

-0.124***
[0.036]

0

Only Wife “At Risk”

0.038

-0.068**
[0.034]

0.055

-0.063*
[0.033]

0.111

Observations
Subsample Retirement Rate
Analysis

2,317
19.5%

2,152
19.7%

Probit

-0.119*
[0.071]

-0.129**
[0.063]

561

561

Probit

Propensity Score
Matching

42.6%
Probit

Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by household. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
Note: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. Wave dummies included in all specifications. Additional covariates include whether a wife is retired, whether a husband has a pension,
household wealth, and each spouse’s age, age category, and education level. Propensity score matching
using the radius (0.1) matching approach. Average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) values are
found using the Stata package attr.ado and standard errors are found analytically.
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired, husband
is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the HRS
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Table 9
Additional Specifications Examining Husbands’ Retirements with Job Characteristics
1
2
Original Specification
Waves 3 through 8
Means
Wave 3
through
Wave 8

Husband’s
Risk and
Wife’s Nonshared Risk

Husband “at risk” of losing health
insurance if he retires

0.215

-0.072***
[0.013]

Both “at risk” of losing health
insurance if husband retires

0.184

-0.066***
[0.014]

-0.064***
[0.014]

Only husband “at risk” of losing
health insurance if he retires

0.031

-0.106***
[0.023]

-0.101***
[0.023]

Only wife “at risk” of losing health
insurance if husband retires

0.032

Job Requirement: “Physical effort”
all or most of the time

Husband’s
Risk and
Wife’s Nonshared Risk

Fully
Exclusive
Risk
Categories

-0.070***
[0.013]

-0.052**
[0.024]

-0.051**
[0.024]

0.288

-0.008
[0.013]

-0.008
[0.013]

Job Req.: “Good eyesight”
all or most of the time

0.807

-0.02
[0.018]

-0.02
[0.018]

Job Req.: “Intense concentration”
all or most of the time

0.788

-0.014
[0.017]

-0.014
[0.017]

Job Req.: “People skills”
all or most of the time

0.797

-0.008
[0.015]

-0.008
[0.015]

Job Condition: Strongly agree or agree
that tasks are more difficult than before

0.505

0.014
[0.012]

0.013
[0.012]

Job Cond.: Strongly agree or agree
that job has a lot of stress

0.580

0
[0.012]

0
[0.012]

Job Cond.: Strongly agree or agree that
older workers feel pressure to retire

0.154

0.069***
[0.017]

0.069***
[0.017]

Job Cond.: Strongly agree or agree that
older workers given less demanding tasks

0.315

-0.028**
[0.012]

-0.027**
[0.012]

Job Req.: At least one value
missing in HRS

0.759

0.018
[0.046]

0.02
[0.046]

Job Cond.: At least one value
missing in HRS

0.080

-0.079***
[0.029]

-0.080***
[0.029]

Job Cond.: Strongly agree or agree
that “enjoy” work

0.095

-0.077***
[0.016]

-0.077***
[0.016]

Job Cond.: Enjoy work
missing in HRS

0.100

-0.032
[0.024]

-0.032
[0.024]

Yes
6661

Yes
6661

Additional Covariates
Observations

6661

-0.054**
[0.024]

Fully
Exclusive
Risk
Categories

3
4
Including Job
Characteristics

Yes
6661

-0.053**
[0.024]

Yes
6661

Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by Household. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Note: “Enjoy job” is only available in waves 3 through 8. Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. Wave dummies
are included in all specifications. Additional covariates include whether a wife is retired, whether a husband has a pension,
household wealth, and each spouse’s age, age category, self-reported health and education level.
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired, husband is not self-employed,
and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the HRS
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Appendix Figure 1:
Appendix Figure 1
Distribution of the Age Gap between Spouses in a Household

Distribution of the Age Gap between Spouses in a Household
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Figure 1:
An Example of the Optimization Problem Facing a Husband when Health
InsuranceAppendix
is Linked
to Employment
Figure
2
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Appendix Table 1
Analysis Using Definitions of Health Insurance Risk that Incorporate Possibility of COBRA
1
Husband’s Risk
and Wife’s
Means
Non-shared
Risk using
Max Age 63.5
Husband “at risk” of losing health
insurance if he retires
Both “at risk” of losing health
insurance if husband retires
Only husband “at risk” of losing
health insurance if he retires
Only wife “at risk” of losing health
insurance if husband retires
Additional Covariates
Observations

0.188

-0.065***
[0.012]

-0.053**
[0.020]

-0.063***
[0.013]
-0.083***
[0.024]
-0.053**
[0.020]

Yes
8417

Yes
8417

0.161
0.027
0.033

8417

2
Fully
Exclusive Risk
Categories
using Maximum
Age 63.5

Note: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. Wave dummies are included in all
specifications. Additional covariates include whether a wife is retired, whether a husband has a
pension, household wealth, and each spouse’s age, age category, self-reported health and education
level.
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired,
husband is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the
HRS
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Appendix Table 2
Decomposition of Changes to Health Insurance Risk Probit MME’s when Adding Additional Covariates Using Ordinary Least Squares
A: Analogous Analysis Using Ordinary Least Squares
1

2

Husband’s Risk and
Wife’s Non-shared
Risk
Husband “At Risk” of Losing Health
Insurance if He Retires

-0.082
[0.010]***

3

4

Fully Exclusive Risk
Categories

-0.058
[0.010]***

Both “At Risk” of Losing Health
Insurance if Husband Retires

-0.080
[0.011]***

-0.053
[0.011]***

Only Husband “At Risk” of Losing
Health Insurance if He Retires

-0.094
[0.019]***

-0.097
[0.021]***

Only Wife “At Risk” of Losing
Health Insurance if Husband Retires
Additional Covariates
Observations

0.052
[0.029]*

-0.054
[0.027]**

0.052
[0.029]*

-0.053
[0.027]**

No
8417

Yes
8417

No
8417

Yes
8417

B: Net Contribution of Covariate Groupings to the Difference in OLS Coefficients
1

2

Husband’s Risk and
Wife’s Non-shared
Risk

3

4

5

Fully Exclusive Risk Categories

Husband
at Risk

Wife Only
at Risk

Both at
Risk

Husband
Only at
Risk

Wife Only
at Risk

Difference in OLS Coefficient

-0.024

0.107

-0.028

0.002

0.106

Husband’s Age Variables
Wife’s Age Variables
Spouse Retired
Pension & Wealth
Health
Husband’s Education
Wife’s Education

-0.030
0.000
0.003
0.001
0.002
0.000
0.000

0.096
0.003
0.006
-0.003
0.002
0.000
0.001

-0.033
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.000
0.000

-0.014
-0.002
0.019
-0.004
0.003
0.000
0.000

0.095
0.003
0.006
-0.003
0.002
0.000
0.001

Difference in Probit MME

-0.021

0.104

-0.018

0.011

0.103

Notes: “Age Variables” include husband’s and wife’s raw age, whether 65 or over, and whether between 62 and 65. “Pension and Wealth” includes whether husband has any pension and household’s
non-housing wealth. “Health” includes husband’s and wife’s self-rated health. “Education” includes
categorical values of “Less than High School,” “Some College,” and “College Degree” for each spouse.
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Appendix Table 3
Analysis of Husbands’ Retirements with Interactions of Other Health Measures
1
2
3
4
Hospital Stay
Health Conditions
in Last Year
Both “at risk” of losing health
insurance if husband retires

-0.060***
[0.012]

-0.062***
[0.016]

-0.060***
[0.012]

-0.059***
[0.015]

Only husband “at risk” of losing health -0.097***
insurance if he retires
[0.021]

-0.099***
[0.025]

-0.096***
[0.021]

-0.087***
[0.023]

Only wife “at risk” of losing health
insurance if husband retires

-0.052**
[0.022]

-0.048*
[0.026]

-0.050**
[0.023]

-0.049**
[0.024]

Husband’s health measure poor

0.034***
[0.011]

0.035***
[0.012]

0.041***
[0.015]

0.049***
[0.016]

Wife’s health measure poor

-0.029***
[0.011]

-0.031***
[0.012]

-0.011
[0.013]

-0.017
[0.014]

Interaction of husband’s poor health
measure with joint HI risk

-0.016
[0.027]

-0.043
[0.033]

Interaction of wife’s poor health
measure with joint HI risk

0.027
[0.027]

0.039
[0.034]

Interaction of husband’s poor health
measure with husband only HI risk

-0.006
[0.048]

-0.105***
[0.042]

Interaction of wife’s poor health
measure with wife only HI risk

-0.011
[0.038]

-0.005
[0.050]

Additional Covariates
Observations

Yes
8397

Yes
8397

Yes
8414

Yes
8414

Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by Household. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
Note 1: Health conditions include ever having diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart problems, or a
stroke. Wave dummies included in all specifications.
Note 2: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights. Wave dummies included in all specifications. Additional covariates include whether a wife is retired, whether a husband has a pension,
household wealth, and each spouse’s age, age category, and education level.
Note 3: MMEs for interaction terms have been adjust based on Ai and Norton (2003).
Sample: Husband or wife had EPHI in the previous wave, husband has not previously retired, husband
is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the HRS
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Appendix Table 4
Additional Specification Examining Husbands’ Retirements with Pension Types
1
2
Husband’s
Fully
Risk and
Exclusive
Wife’s NonRisk
shared Risk Categories
Husband “at risk” of losing health
insurance if he retires
Both “at risk” of losing health
insurance if husband retires
Only husband “at risk” of losing
health insurance if he retires
Only wife “at risk” of losing
health insurance if husband retires
Husband reports both a defined benefit (DB)
and defined contribution (DC) pension
Husband reports only a DB pension
Husband reports only a DC pension
Additional Covariates
Observations

-0.060***
[0.012]

-0.048**
[0.022]
0.051***
[0.016]
0.085***
[0.015]
-0.024*
[0.013]

-0.056***
[0.013]
-0.089***
[0.022]
-0.047**
[0.022]
0.050***
[0.016]
0.084***
[0.015]
-0.024*
[0.013]

Yes
8417

Yes
8417

Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by household. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Note 1: Additional covariates include whether a wife is retired, household wealth,
and each spouse’s age, age category, self-reported health and education level. Wave
dummies are included in all specifications.
Note 2: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights.
Sample: Husband or Wife had EPHI in the previous wave, Husband has not previously
retired, Husband is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War
Baby cohort of the HRS
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Appendix Table 5
The Mean Marginal Effects (MMEs) of Both Spouses’ Health Insurance Risk on Wives’
Retirements

Wife “At Risk” of Losing Health
Insurance if She Retires
Both “At Risk” of Losing Health
Insurance if Wife Retires
Only Wife “At Risk” of Losing
Health Insurance if She Retires
Only Husband “At Risk” of Losing
Health Insurance if Wife Retires

1

2

3

Variable
Means

Wife’s
Risk Only

Wife’s
Risk and
Husband’s Nonshared Risk

Fully
Exclusive
Risk
Categories

0.148

-0.068***
[0.010]

-0.068***
[0.010]

0.065

-0.019
[0.040]

-0.072***
[0.014]
-0.064***
[0.012]
-0.019
[0.040]

Yes
8,594

Yes
8,594

0.083
0.006

Additional Covariates
Observations

Yes
8,594

Standard errors in brackets. Clustered by household. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
Note 1: Additional covariates include whether a husband is retired, household wealth, and each
spouse’s age, age category, self-reported health and education level. Wave dummies are included
in all specifications.
Note 2: Values are weighted based on HRS sampling weights.
Sample: Husband or Wife had EPHI in the previous wave, wife has not previously retired, wife
is not self-employed, and one spouse is age eligible for Initial or War Baby cohort of the HRS
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